In Re Delinquency of D.C.

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

IN RE DELINQUENCY OF D.C.

No. 1 CA-JV 24-0165
FILED 05-06-2025

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. JV210417
The Honorable Christian Bell, Judge Pro Tempore

VACATED AND REMANDED

COUNSEL

Coolidge Law Firm, PLLC, Chandler
By Jennifer L.B. Booth & Todd K. Coolidge
Counsel for Appellant

Maricopa County Attorney’s Office, Phoenix
By Jordan A. Smith
Counsel for Appellee

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Paul J. McMurdie delivered the Court’s decision, in which Presiding
Judge Anni Hill Foster and Judge Michael J. Brown joined.
 IN RE DELINQUENCY OF D.C.
Decision of the Court

M c M U R D I E, Judge:

¶1 Dylan Carter (a pseudonym) appeals from the juvenile court’s
orders accepting his plea agreement, imposing a one-year probation term,
and then denying his motion to withdraw from the agreement. After
reviewing the record, we vacate the plea agreement and remand for further
proceedings.

FACTS1 AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶2 In April 2024, Dylan and Brian Charles (a pseudonym) started
quarreling inside a locker room at their school. As tensions escalated, Dylan
approached Brian, and they faced off against each other while other boys
watched. Dylan sought to hit Brian, and Brian tried to hit him back. At some
point, Dylan hit Brian’s face, which caused him to fall backward and hit his
head on a cement seat, ending the fight.

¶3 The State filed a delinquency petition charging Dylan with
aggravated assault, a Class 4 felony, and disorderly conduct, a Class 1
misdemeanor. The State offered Dylan a plea agreement for a lesser charge
of aggravated assault of a victim with a substantially impaired capacity to
resist, a Class 6 undesignated felony, which he accepted. The court entered
the plea and adjudicated Dylan as delinquent. It placed Dylan on one year
of standard probation for the aggravated assault offense. A week later,
Dylan moved to withdraw from the plea agreement, which the juvenile
court denied after a hearing. Dylan appealed. We have jurisdiction under
Article 6, Section 9, of the Arizona Constitution and Arizona Revised
Statutes (“A.R.S.”) § 8-235(A).

DISCUSSION

¶4 Dylan raises five issues: (1) whether a factual basis that only
reads the elements of an offense into the record during a change of plea is
legally sufficient; (2) whether there is an adequate factual basis in the record
to support a plea of aggravated assault; (3) whether his plea was knowing,
voluntary, and intelligent; (4) whether counsel was ineffective; and
(5) whether there was a violation of his Sixth Amendment right to
conflict-free representation. We only address the issue of the sufficiency of
the factual basis to support a plea of aggravated assault because it is

1 We review the facts in the light most favorable to affirming the
findings of the superior court. In re Daniel A., 210 Ariz. 162, 164, ¶ 2 (App.
2005).

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Decision of the Court

dispositive. Dylan argues the factual basis in the record cannot support his
plea of aggravated assault upon a victim whose capacity to resist was
substantially impaired. See A.R.S. § 13-1204(A)(4). We review the denial of
a motion to withdraw from a plea for an abuse of discretion. See In re Niky
R., 203 Ariz. 387, 390, ¶ 10 (App. 2002); see also State v. Slover, 220 Ariz. 239,
242, ¶ 4 (App. 2009) (“A trial court abuses its discretion if it misapplies the
law or exercises its discretion based on incorrect legal principles.”). A court
should vacate a plea if the factual basis does not support the underlying
crime. State v. Cain, 152 Ariz. 479, 482 (App. 1987).

¶5 When a defendant accepts a plea, a factual basis is needed to
“avoid the possibility . . . [that] a legally innocent defendant [] pleaded
guilty out of ignorance, deception, delusion, feelings of moral guilt, or
self-destructive inclinations.” State v. Durham, 108 Ariz. 327, 329 (1972). For
a plea agreement, the factual basis must be for the crime pled to and not the
original charge being dismissed. State v. Louden, 127 Ariz. 249, 251 (App.
1980). While the court need not find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, strong
evidence of actual guilt is required. State v. Reynolds, 25 Ariz. App. 409, 412
(1976). A court’s failure to establish a factual basis at the change of plea
hearing is not reversible error if the extended record establishes a factual
basis for the plea. State v. Rodriguez, 112 Ariz. 193, 194-95 (1975). In a juvenile
proceeding, due process requires that the factual basis supports a juvenile’s
admission. Ariz. R.P. Juv. Ct. 220(c)(3); Maricopa County Juv. Action No.
J-90110, 127 Ariz. 389, 393 (App. 1980); Maricopa County Juv. Action No.
J-86715, 122 Ariz. 300, 302-03 (App. 1979).

¶6 Dylan contends the factual basis cannot support his plea of
aggravated assault because the extended record contradicts his admission
that Brian’s capacity to resist was substantially impaired. He argues the
fight was mutual and that the assault stopped after Brian fell to the ground.

¶7 A defendant’s admission of guilt does not resolve whether the
acts committed constitute the crime charged. McCarthy v. United States, 394
U.S. 459, 467 (1969). The rule is specifically “designed to protect a defendant
who is in the position of pleading voluntarily with an understanding of the
nature of the charge but without realizing that his conduct does not actually
fall within the charge.” Id. (quotation omitted); see also Reynolds, 25 Ariz.
App. at 413 (“Because of the importance of [e]nsuring that guilty pleas are
a product of free and intelligent choice, when a plea of guilty is coupled
with a statement by the defendant as to his innocence, the trial court has a
duty to inquire into and resolve the conflict between the waiver of trial and
the claim of innocence.”). A court “must determine that the conduct which
the defendant admits constitutes the offense charged in the indictment or

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Decision of the Court

information.” McCarthy, 394 U.S. at 467 (quotation omitted). “[B]ecause a
guilty plea is an admission of all of the elements of a formal criminal charge,
it cannot be truly voluntary unless the defendant possesses an
understanding of the law in relation to the facts.” Id. at 466.

¶8 Under A.R.S. § 13-1204(A)(4), a person commits aggravated
assault “[i]f the person commits the assault while the victim is bound or
otherwise physically restrained or while the victim’s capacity to resist is
substantially impaired.” A victim’s capacity to resist is substantially
impaired if the victim’s ability to “refuse to submit” is “considerably
weakened,” Maricopa County Juv. Action No. JV-123196, 172 Ariz. 74, 77
(App. 1992), such as when the victim is asleep or unconscious, State v.
Duarte, 246 Ariz. 338, 343, ¶ 12 (App. 2018). If the assault itself causes
substantial impairment, further assaultive conduct must follow the
impairment to constitute aggravated assault under the subsection.
JV-123196, 172 Ariz. at 78. Other than Dylan’s admission, no facts support
the element of substantial impairment in this case. Although Brian fell to
the ground after Dylan hit him, at that point Dylan stopped hitting Brian.
Thus, the assault was not aggravated because there was no further
assaultive conduct that followed Brian’s impairment.

¶9 The State argues the record establishes an acceptable factual
basis because Brian’s capacity to resist was substantially impaired before
the assault occurred, given the enclosed nature of the environment—the
locker room and the presence of other boys. But the State failed to offer
evidence to establish that the locker room or the presence of others
amounted to a sufficient factual basis to accept Dylan’s guilty plea to
aggravated assault under A.R.S. § 13-1204(A)(4). While the capacity to resist
includes the ability to flee from a situation, it is not determinative, and the
substantial impairment must affect the victim’s capacity to resist. See
JV-123196, 172 Ariz. at 77-78 (Although the victim escaped, his capacity to
resist was substantially impaired because his vision was blurred to the
point where it was difficult for him to ride his bicycle.).

¶10 The locker room and presence of other boys did not
substantially impair Brian’s capacity to resist. No one—neither Brian, the
other witnesses, nor the police by affidavit—claimed the environment was
confined or weakened Brian’s ability to refuse to submit. Likewise, nothing
in the record suggests that Brian tried to escape or could not do so because
of the presence of others. Rather, the record reflects that Brian could engage
and participate in the fight with Dylan. Thus, Brian’s capacity to resist was
not substantially impaired before the assault.

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Decision of the Court

¶11 When faced with the evidence surrounding the assault that
contradicted Dylan’s admission, it was error for the superior court to deny
the motion to withdraw from the plea.

CONCLUSION

¶12 We vacate the plea and remand for further proceedings
consistent with this decision.

MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JR

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